times quoting his previous volume verbally. Reviewing his first book, Kellison explains its double standpoint: "After a long commendation of Scripture and a great difference which I put betwixt the Pope's decrees and Scripture, I give the precedence and preeminence to Scripture. But yet I prove that the bare letter is no mòre Scripture than the body is a man without a soul." 9 This is the question of what he called the "form" of Scripture.
For I affirm there, the word is compounded of the sound or letter, and the sense or meaning; and that is as the matter, this as the form, that as the body, this as the soul; and so the word of God is not the letter only, but the letter with a true sense and meaning; and consequently the word of God cannot have a false meaning; but the same letter, as it may have a true and a false meaning, so with a true meaning it is the word of God, with a false sense it is the word of the devil.
10
The devil can give a false meaning to any writing. Truly, in the exchange between Christ and the devil during the temptation in the desert, Jesus rebuked Satan with scriptural arguments. Yet "Scripture only convinced not the devil, but Scripture sensed by a lawful interpreter, as Christ was."
11
Once the sense of Scripture is known, the holy books brook no peer. Kellison does not hesitate to pursue the comparison of Scripture with other writings of the Church; and he determines their difference in authority as arising from the different ways in which God guarantees them: "Wherein a difference is put betwixt Scripture and definitions of the Church, Pope or Councils. Because they are assisted by the Holy Ghost only that they may define the truth, and so the sense of a Council's definition confirmed by the Pope is of the Holy Ghost, but it is not necessary that every word or reason in a Council proceed from the Holy Spirit of God." 12 Kellison in no way disparages papal authority. He is no conciliarist; and a council's definitions for him stand only when they have been confirmed by the pope. Nonetheless, he maintains an essential distinction between the kind of authority wielded by papal or conciliar documents, and that which belongs to Holy Writ: Wherefore, as I said, let them not charge us with contempt of Scripture, for our opinion and estimation of Scripture is most venerable, if it be indeed Scripture;
• Ibid., p. 23. M Ibid., p. 23. »Kellison, A Reply to Sutdife's Answer, fol. 47r. u Ibid., fol. 49v.
yea, we avouch that in itself it is of far greater authority than is the Church or her definitions, because, though God assists both, yet after a most notable manner he assists holy writers in writing of Scripture, because he assists them infallibly, not only for the sense and verity but also for every word which they write and every reason and whatsoever is in Scripture, whereas he assists the Popes and Councils infallibly only for the sense and verity of that which they intend to define, but neither for every word, nor for every reason, nor for everything which is incidentally spoken.
18
The verbal inspiration of Scripture extends much further than God's guidance of papal and conciliar definitions: in the latter the truth only, in the former the words also, are guaranteed by God. Since Scripture, fully understood as word of God, is not the letter but the meaning of the holy books, one should know how to ascertain that meaning. In principle, the apostles, who received the letter of Scripture from God, received also its meaning: "I confess also that our faith is principally grounded upon the Prophets' and Apostles' writings, which are God's word, but how shall we know that these writings are God's word, or thus to be understood, unless the Church and her pastors preach it and propose it?" M It is, therefore, the kerygma of the living Church which provides the meaning of Scripture: "So Scripture, which is of itself of more authority than the testimony of men, and faith also, which has God's word and authority for her ground, foundation and formal object, in respect of us depends of preachers, revelations not being ordinary, and not only of inward inspiration but also of outward hearing." 16 To imagine that God will reveal the meaning of Scripture to each individual Christian is a delusion, the mother of illuminism and enthusiasm. Such revelations are possible; they are "not ordinary." The ordinary way is to listen to the Church. "Our best will be ... to listen to the common received, that is, the Roman, Church, who, as she has ever had the custody of the book of Scripture, so it is most like that she best knows the meaning of it, having this book from the Apostles and, with it, the Apostles' and their successors' interpretation." 1 « One might expect Kellison at this point to identify tradition with the Church's function of transmitting the sense of Holy Writ, of preaching and teaching it. Certainly, this would correspond to the modern concept M Ibid., fol. 50v.
14 Ibid. t fol. 6r. » Ibid., fol. 6v. » Kellison, Survey, p. 33.
of tradition : the Church proclaims doctrine through papal and conciliar definitions, which are themselves infallibly protected by God as to their sense and truth, though not in their wording. Yet it would be fallacious to mistake our own problematic for that of the incipient seventeenth century. Kellison proposes, in fact, another description, which would not be adequate in terms of modern theology, but which still corresponds to the medieval equation of traditio with consuetudo: "Tradition is nothing else but an opinion or custom of the Church, not written in Holy Writ, but yet delivered by the hands of the Church from time to time and from Christians to Christians even into the last age." Percy does not wish to undermine Scripture. On the contrary, he extols it in its own order: "True it is, there is the virtue and power of God in the Scripture; there is purity and perfection of matter, majesty of speech, power over the conscience, certainty of the prophecies, etc " 18 Were one to insist that Scripture is sufficient, this can even be admitted; but "if it import sufficiency, it is not meant that alone sufficiency of which our question is, but at the most sufficiency in suo genere, in a certain limited kind, to wit, of written Scripture."
19
This sufficiency must be limited on several counts. The great inner qualities of Scripture which Percy willingly recognizes do not shine like light to our understanding till it be illuminated with the light of faith... nor then neither unless those things be propounded duely, mediate or immediate, by the authority of the Church; upon which, being like a candlestick, the light of the Scripture must be set, or else it will not, according to the ordinary 17 
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course of God's providence, sufficiently shine and appear unto us in such sort as to give infallible assurance that it is the word of God.
30
The necessity of the act of faith makes Scripture insufficient, for it is from God Himself that the act of faith proceeds in us. The task of the Church in proposing the contents of revelation introduces another intrinsic limitation to the sufficiency of Scripture: the Church must intervene by presenting the object of faith. This function of the Church leads Percy to a more radical limitation of Scripture's authority, in regard to the question of unwritten revelation, concerning which Catholics and Protestants differ deeply:
Now the question is betwixt us and Protestants, whether God did reveal anything to the Prophets and Apostles, manifested by their means to men living in their times, and necessary to be believed of men living in succeeding ages, which was never written or at least which is not now expressed nor so contained in the Scriptures, that by evident and necessary consequence, secluding all Tradition and Church authority, it may be gathered out of some sentence expressly set down in Holy Scriptures.
21
The problem concerns revelations duly made to the apostles and transmitted, since then, outside of Scripture. What is in Scripture, for Percy, must be explicitly stated in specific verses or may be logically deduced. At the basis of Percy's further explanations of tradition there lies a narrow concept of the "virtually revealed." He must logically conclude that few doctrines are explicitly stated in Scriptures or may be deduced in strict Aristotelian logic; in this case another channel must exist for the doctrines that cannot be related to Scripture in this precise way.
Thus Percy arrives at the notion of extrascriptural traditions: "By this little which I have said, it is apparent enough that the divine Revelation whereupon Christian faith is to be grounded is not contained only in the bare letter of the Scripture, but is also found in the unwritten Traditions of the true Catholic Church.
, Percy's explanation clarifies the difference between the authority of revelation, contained in Scriptures and traditions, and the authority of the Church that protects and proposes them: "For the written and unwritten word, being the divine Revelation itself, concurs to the assent as the formal reason of the object; whereas Church proposition or affirmation is only a condition, by the ordinary law of God, necessarily requisite to our infallible supernatural assent." 28 In other words, the Scriptures and the traditions contain the revelation and are the word of God even for the benefit of the living pastors of the Church. Yet, in the ordinary course of things, it is by the testimony of these living pastors that the faithful know for certain what is and what is not stated in the Scriptures and the traditions. The magisterium is a condition, but not the object, of faith. It is the guide chosen by God to interpret Scripture and tradition:
The same Church, which by the assistance of God's Spirit, has hitherto preserved and shall be always able to preserve true divine Scriptures and to assure us which they be and to distinguish them from apocryphal books... has been and shall always, by the assistance of the promised Spirit, be able to preserve and to assure The Church is not extraneous to Scripture and tradition. Rather, these together constitute the gospel, which is intimately related to the Church: "I shew to my adversaries... that, if they do not admit Tradition and Church-authority, they have no sufficient means to know infallibly that the Gospel itself is Scripture. The force of which argu ment is grounded in the mutual connexion which is betwixt the Gospel and Church-authority, either of which bears witness of the other, as our Saviour did bear witness of St. John Baptist and St. John Baptist of our Saviour." Percy adds that by divine infused faith one "may be as sured both of the authorty of Scripture and of the Church, and of the mutual connexion which they have one with the other, and of the reciprocal proof and testimony which they give and receive from the other." 82 So far, John Percy's conceptions represent a rather sophisticated ap proach to the problem of Scripture and tradition as seen within the larger question of the nature of the act of faith. By placing this question in the context of the theology of faith, Percy was opening new ground. By seeking a solution in the inseparable interrelationship of three terms, the Scriptures, the traditions, and the magisterium, he was also Polemics and discussions turn sterile, and arguments fly at cross-purposes, if no agreement has been reached on the sense of the texts. Therefore "that which importeth for the final and infallible deciding of controversies arising from the Scripture is to find out the true sense thereof intended by the Holy Ghost, to which all parties will profess without any tergiversations to yield and subscribe."
40
That a possible meaning of the text is intended by the Holy Spirit is the important thing. Such a meaning may be "littéral or mystical," for the Spirit may express Himself through the plain meaning or through a more abstruse content of the scriptural texts. Yet mystical senses, since they are harder to determine, seldom provide the true sense of Scripture. "It cannot be denied that a firm argument may be taken from any sense, littéral or mystical, so long as it appeareth that sense to be true and intended by the Holy Ghost; but because it is most difficult to know and discern when these mystical and spiritual senses are true and so intended by the Holy Ghost, therefore ordinarily speaking, arguments from this sense are weak, uncertain and not sufficient absolutely to determine a point of faith." 41 Anderson agrees in this with Thomas Aquinas and with all Protestant authors, who, while admitting the possibility of spiritual senses, find that these are seldom trustworthy. Anderson may thus conclude to everybody's satisfaction: "it is our general doctrine that, seeing it is certain, that sense which is immediately gathered from the words to be the sense of the Holy Ghost, that therefore from the littéral sense are we to take arguments that will be efficacious." Anderson's predecessors. Another reason is that "Christ opened [the Apostles'] understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures, which certainly he did not for them alone but much more for his Church; and so accordingly the Apostles delivered to the Church the true sense thereof; for if they had delivered the words but not the sense, they had not preached the Gospel." 47 The sense of Scripture seems, then, to be kept through a sort of parallel transmission somehow duplicating Scripture, the words being preserved in one way and one place, the sense being kept in another way and another place. Yet what is important is not the double knowledge, of words and of meaning, implied here; it is the unity of the two in the concept of "understanding the Scripture": "Seeing the Church is the pillar and ground of truth, and truth properly and truly is in the understanding of the Scriptures, not in the writing or words, but improperly and as in a sign, it evidently follows that she has a certain knowledge of the truths which are contained in the Scriptures. Calvin replies that the doctrine of the Prophets and of the New Testament were not additions to the Law, but explications thereof, as being taught or contained in the Law, though not in particular, yet in general. But I suppose Calvinists will not deny but that they believe more than is written in the Law, and no otherwise does the Law contain them than in general and, as it were, virtually: but so likewise are Traditions contained therein, and so no additions. word of mouth, the Holy Ghost inspiring them or Christ being the author of them: and these we believe to have as infallible authority of truth as if they had been written in the Scriptures." 68 In the light of Anderson's approach, "not written" is not the same as "not implied" in Scripture. It means that besides the immediate connotation of the written word, which the Church knows in her heart, the Church's doctrine also contains points or practices which, without being, strictly speaking, the meaning of a written passage, nevertheless are "no additions," being contained in Scripture "in general and, as it were, virtually." These traditions, although remote from the literal meaning of Scripture, appear, in this perspective, similar to the "mystical and spiritual senses." They are difficult to determine by reading Scripture, yet quite certainly they are the sense of the Holy Spirit as soon as the Church proclaims them.
Undoubtedly, another analogy may also be made: the Church's knowledge of Scripture and of tradition originates in an inspiration by God. This is not far removed from the Calvinist notion of interior testimony. Anderson, however, distinguishes carefully between his appeal to the Church as the depository of the unwritten word, or traditional meaning of the Scriptures, and the Calvinist appeal to the Spirit: "Some object that the Church receives from God inspiring her the right sense of Scripture, and so first decides the controversy in her mind before she can exteriorly decide what is to be believed: therefore the Spirit speaking in her heart is the supreme Judge, even to Catholics." Notably enough, Anderson does not deny this. Yet he does not make the testimony of the Spirit to the heart of Church leaders the rule of faith: there is no rule of faith until their interior conviction of the sense of Scripture has been publicly endorsed by the Church in a judicial sentence: "The motions of the Spirit inspiring the pastors of the Church are unknown to others and to themselves uncertain, until they be outwardly decreed and subscribed by the head and members of the Church, and so are no judicial sentences or final decisions or rules infallible, either to themselves or others." 69 Undoubtedly, the rule of faith cannot be a subjective persuasion in the hearts of bishops or popes. Only when the Church as a whole has spoken is the meaning of revelation known for certain. Yet this does not destroy the analogy » Ibid., p. 23. » Ibid., pp. 119-20.
between the testimony of the Spirit to the heart of the faithful and Hb testimony to the heart of the Church. The former is the Calvinist rendering of the Catholic insight which the latter formulation expresses. The real difference lies in ecclesiology : either one identifies the Church with each faithful relationship to God speaking in His word; or, on the contrary, over and above His testimony to the heart of each Christian, the Spirit gives a wider testimony to the heart of all, together mystically present in the supernatural structure of the Body of Christ.
MATTHEW WILSON AND WILLIAM CHILLINGWORTH
In The Catholic reverence for Scripture is affirmed from the outset: "No cause imaginable could avert our will from giving the function of supreme and sole judge to Holy Writ, if both the thing were not impossible in itself, and if both reason and experience did not convince our understanding that by this assertion, contentions are increased and not ended."
60 Scripture is "a most perfect rule, forasmuch as a writing can be a rule"; yet Catholics deny "that it excludes either divine Tradition, though it be unwritten, or an external judge to keep, to propose, to interpret it in a true, orthodox and catholic sense. from Scripture, but it is to be pre-supposed, before we can see the light thereof; and consequently there must be some other means precedent to Scripture, to beget faith, which can be no other than the Church."
68
This was firmly traditional ground. But Chillingworth refuted something else, namely, the concept of tradition as a separate transmission of given doctrines by other than scriptural conveyance. He wrote, apparently without a smile, that the sense of Wilson's argument "must be this: when only a part of the Scripture was written, then a part of the divine doctrine was unwritten; therefore now, when all the Scripture is written, yet some part of the divine doctrine is yet unwritten."* 9 The discussion went at cross-purposes. Matthew Wilson explained the classical conception of the correlation between Church and Scripture, while Chillingworth refuted a position close to that which was later to be called the two-source theory. Thomas White is conscious of the originality of Rushworth's Dialogues: their doctrine, he writes in the epistle dedicatory of the Apology y "takes a path not much beaten by our modern controvertiste."
71 They use "the antique weapons of Dialogues," which "want neither ornament nor particular efficacy," though White's Apology will change this "into the modern mode of direct discourse."
72 The dialogue takes place between "Uncle" and "Nephew," Uncle answering the puzzled questions of Nephew in regard to controversies of religion. The unbeaten path mentioned by White is that which some of Uncle's answers follow. It will appear from the doctrine of Scripture and tradition contained in these volumes.
The starting point for Rushworth-White's investigation is sharply formulated by Nephew: Why "we Catholics, who bear so great reverence and veneration to the Holy Scripture, receive more of it than others, write infinite volumes of commentaries upon it (as Paul's Churchyard can witness) and are so exact to improve ourselves (I mean our learned men) in the knowledge of it, should, nevertheless, when we come to join in the main point, that is, to the decision of controversies in religion, seem to fly off and recur to other judges, though we acknowledge it to be Christ's word and law?" 71 Nephew is understandably puzzled by this apparently double-faced attitude. Uncle acknowledges the problem as it may appear to the observer : "I see by experience that the one part seeks by all means to destroy the authority of God's Church, and the other seems to lessen the power of Scripture for the deciding of controversies." 74 A significant difference is made between the part that "seeks to destroy" and the part that only "seems to lessen." One can already sense what Rushworth's answer will attempt to show: while one part does seek to destroy the authority of the Church, the other's lessening of the authority of Scripture is only a mistaken appearance. One can also sense this in the remote consequences that Rushworth foresees: since "we think by Scripture alone, left without the guard of the Church, nothing or at least not enough for the salvation of mankind can be sufficiently proved," it follows that, in our view, "to stand by Scripture only, as they do," may be "but a plausible way to atheism," so that the ultimate question will be "whether we must rely upon a Church or be atheists." In order to escape this dire consequence, one must show that Scripture does resolve points of controversy. And if this can be made manifest, the Catholic side must give way: "we were worse than beasts if we should refuse to be judged thereby." 76 Rushworth is prepared to stake all on the outcome of his investigation.
The inquiry begins with Scripture, since Protestants claim to know all the faith with Scripture alone. How does one read Scripture? Rushworth distinguishes two ways, scholarly and plain. But only the plain way is relevant to the question of understanding Scripture. For Scripture is not given to scholars: all the people of God must be able to understand Scripture if Scripture is indeed the conveyer of revelation. The question of the scientific reading of Scripture is, therefore, irrelevant to our problem.
There are two manners of understanding Scripture, the one a kind of large manner, taking it in gross and a great deal together as we take a discourse of play which pleasingly passes away without great demur or particular weighing of every word; the other more curious and exact looking into every little property which may breed diversity. And I suppose you would tell me that this second belongs only to scholars, but that the former guides our life and governs our actions I must needs confess that what good effect soever is the end for which Scripture was ordained, if it be anything belonging to man's life and conversation, it must be compassed by this gross, common and ordinary course of reading and understanding. The plain manner of understanding Scripture is described many times in the three volumes of Thomas White. It is for him the only religious way, the only one that matters for the knowledge of Scripture and revelation. It is also, paradoxically enough, the more certain.
This common manner of using Scripture is more secure than the minute and precise balancing of every phrase and syllable. For neither the variety of translations, nor errors of copies, nor difficulties of languages, nor mutability of words, nor multiplicity of the occasions and intentions of the authors, nor the abundance of things written, nor different framings of the books-all which are causes of uncertainty in a rigorous examination-have any such power to break the common and ordinary sense of the writer in general, as we every day find by experience.
77
Thus White proceeds analogically from our daily experience of reading and writing. The meaning of an author is not ascertained by exact philological inquiry into each of the words he uses, but the sense is grasped by our mind seeing a sentence, a chapter, or a book as a whole. In such a way the Church Fathers read and expounded Scripture, and there is no reason now to depart from their method:
You shall have them cite many places, some proper, some allegorical, some common, all some times avoidable if they be taken separately but the whole discourse more or less forcible according to the natural parts or heavenly light more or less communicated to one than to another, yet still in the proportion of orators who speak to the multitude and not to Socrates or Crysippus.
78
Given these two possible ways of interpreting Scripture, it is in relation to the second that the controversy between Catholics and Protestants must be resolved, unless we wish to be lost in "a labyrinth of voluntary and unendable disputations."
79 Protestants challenge us on the basis of the first way of reading Scripture. They want us to show "every point of our faith in particular" in Holy Writ. 80 Catholics should eschew this pitfall: "To what end, unless for gallantry and to show wit, should they undertake to prove their tenets by Scripture? For this were to strengthen their opponent in his own ground and principle, that all proof is to be drawn from the Bible."
81 Yet how far the plain reading of Scripture can take us in the direction of the full Catholic faith remains a legitimate question.
Here lies the originality of the Dialogues. Thomas White does not simply deny or refute the possibility of proving all points of faith from Scripture alone. Once he has distinguished a scientific and an ordinary way of reading Scripture, he maintains that the second supports the Catholic faith. Such is the assertion made in the Dialogues: "The other means or way to make one a Catholic"-corresponding to "showing every point of our faith in particular" from Scripture-"is by some common principle; as if by reading of Scripture we find nothing contrary to the Catholic tenet or practise which our adversary calls in question, or also if we find it commended there in general or the authors and observers of it praised. And in this way I doubt not but a sensible and discreet reading of Scripture at large may and will make any true student of it a perfect believing Catholic, so he proceeds with indifference and with a mind rather to know Scripture than to look for this or that point in it." 82 This passage was reproduced with minor modifications in the edition of 1654. The reading that Rushworth envisions here is indeed that of Scripture alone, without the help of tradition. This is made clear elsewhere: "I think that the Catholic cause may not only be maintained by Scripture, but also that it has the better standing precisely to Scripture alone" 83 -a statement which was still reinforced in the text of 1654: "For I think Catholic religion may not only be proved by Scripture, but that, standing exactly and precisely to the written Word, Catholicism is far more maintainable than Protestancy." This was followed by a word of caution: "I confess that this kind of disputing is not fit for many auditors, but only persons of moderation and understanding." 84 Although the second formulation avoids the Protestant expression "Scripture alone," it is actually more forceful: the vague subject "Catholic cause" has become the much more exact "Catholic religion" and "Catholicism." Thomas White's Apology for Rushworth? s Dialogues carefully explains these passages, supports them, and professes to give their standing and strength in Catholic opinion. The text is long but deserves to be fully quoted:
Thirdly, we confess the Bible contains all parts of Catholic doctrine, in this sense that all Catholic doctrine may be found there, by places and arguments be deducted thence, nay more; be topically or oratoricaUy proved out of it: so that, if an able preacher be in a pulpit, where he speaks without contradiction, with a full and free scope, he may, merely discoursing out of Scripture, carry any point of Catholic doctrine before the generality of his auditory, and convince at the present such a part of them as either are but indifferently speculative or have not taken pains in the question.
Fourthly, I affirm that if any point be brought to an eristica! decision before judges, where the parties on both sides are obstinately bent to defend their own positions, by all the art they can imagine; so the question be not, which part is true, but only which is more or less conformable to Scripture, the Catholic position may be victoriously evidenced, by arguments purely drawn from thence, compared and valued according to true criticism, without the aid of Fathers, explications or any other extrinsecal helps. Thus far I esteem all good Catholics do defacto hold.
86
In this important page White affirms two distinct points. In the first place, an oratorical use of the Bible in preaching can fully establish the Catholic faith to the satisfaction of the average auditor. Evidently, such a recourse to Scripture does not stand on the literal sense alone. It is, as White says, "topical or oratorical." It corresponds to the essential purpose of Scripture, which is "to inform our lives by an ordinary reading of it, or by preaching, singing, and such like uses."
In the second place, even at the tribunal of the letter alone, with the use of all the tools of criticism, the Catholic faith can be established with sufficient evidence to be accepted by an impartial judge. This is not to say that all judges would accept the evidence. For White rejects the equivalence of his position with another, against which, as he says, he "engages the Catholic negative," namely, that "the Scripture be a sufficient storehouse to furnish either side with texts, unavoidable and convincing beyond any shadow of reply, in the judgement of sworn and expert judges who are well practised what convincing signifies, and how much the various acceptions of words and mutability of meanings import in the construction of sentences." 87 Recourse to Scripture alone in favor of the Catholic faith does not, in White's opinion, make all shadow of reply impossible, for there is always the possibility of quibbling on the meaning of terms. It is, nevertheless, strong enough to counterbalance the Protestant appeal to Scriptum sola by making the Catholic interpretation of Scripture reasonably plausible. In other words, it does not fully establish the "truth" of Catholicism; but it supports its "conformity" with Scripture. Should one object that this 89 The Dialogues define it in similar ways: an opinion which "passes for a thing delivered by hand to hand from Christ." 90 "A Tradition, or a point of faith delivered by tradition, is a point universally preached and delivered by the Apostles and imprinted in the hearts of the Christian world, and by a universal belief and practise continued unto our days, whereof our warrant is no other than that we find the present Church in quiet possession of it, and whereof no beginning is known."
91 "The Tradition we speak of is the public preaching and teaching and practise exercised in the Church, settled by the Apostles through the world." 92 Since tradition is this universal transmission of doctrines and practices from the apostles down to us, White distinguishes between written and verbal tradition. Written tradition is the Scripture itself, in which tradition is expressed in a set form of words that can no longer change. Verbal tradition is the transmission of ideas, which may be expressed with different words and terms in diverse countries and circumstances: "The meaning of verbal, here intended, is only as contradistinguished to written Tradition; which, being in set words, whose interpretation is continually subject to dispute, is therefore opposed to oral or mental, where the sense is known, and all the question is about the words and expressions. The Catholic reading of Scripture results from the convergence of the known tradition upon the written word, and conversely, the errors of heretics derive from their separation of Scripture from tradition.
Whoever have at any time, under the pretense of reformation, opposed her authority, such have constantly raised up their altar against Tradition upon the dead letter of the Scriptures: which, as the Catholic Church highly reverences, when they are animated by the interpretation of Tradition; so, by too much experience, she knows they become a killing letter, when abused, against the Catholic sense, in the mouths of the devil and his ministers.
95
In these conditions it becomes important to know where the strength and value of tradition comes from. How does one know that a belief is indeed the tradition handed down by the apostles? The contention of the Reformers, that many traditions of the Catholic Church were in fact traditions of men falsely attributed to the apostles, must be taken seriously if tradition is made, as it now is, the touchstone of the right reading of Scripture.
White's solution falls back upon the traditional notion of the presence of the gospel in the heart of the Church: "You rely upon the testimony of the whole Christian Church, you rely upon the force of nature, borne to continue from father to child, you rely upon the promises of Jesus Christ of continuing his Church unto the end of the world, and upon the efficacy of the Holy Ghost sent to perform it, by whom Christ's law was written in Christians' hearts and so to be continued to the day of doom."
96 What imports here is the testimony of the present Church in its totality, not that of a few scholars. "For our faith being in some sort naturally grafted in the hearts of Christians, learned men may now and then mistake some points of it, as well as the causes and effects of their own nature itself."
97 Its strength resides in the unanimity of the interior Christian sense in spite of differences in national cultures, "the root and strength of the body and substance of Catholic doctrine, there is no doubt among Catholics but their reliance is upon Tradition, this being the main profession of great and small, learned and unlearned, that Christian Religion is and has been continued in our Church, since the days of Our Saviour, the very same faith the Apostles taught all nations, and upon that score they receive it." 104 White carries this principle to the point of contradicting "our Schoolmen," "very many" of whom "maintain that Tradition is necessary only for some points not clearly expressed in Scripture" :
106 this is what they say, but it is not what they do, for "there is a wide distance betwixt these two questions, what a man relies on for his assent or faith, and what he says he thinks he relies on."
106 White refers explicitly to Bellarmine. The Fathers knew better than that, for a Father "being nearer to the Fountain, could less doubt that the stream, of which he saw no other rise, reached home to the Springhead."
107
White's concept of tradition as that which has been with Christians, inscribed in their hearts, from the beginning, in the form of ideas that could be expressed in different sets of words, does not rule out a development of tradition. But the development in question progresses only in extension, as when a formerly local tradition becomes universal. "We acknowledge some points of faith to have come in later than others, and give the cause of it, that the Tradition, whereon such points rely, was, at the beginning, a particular one, but so that at the time when it became universal, it had a testimony even beyond exception, by which it gained such a general acknowledgement." 108 A development in depth, therefore, White would not accept in matters of faith. If such a development seems to have taken place, its scope remains within theological knowledge and does not affect faith itself: "I shall not deny the Church may come to know somewhat which haply before she never reflected on. But then those new truths belong to the science we call theology, not to faith; and even for those, the Church relies on Tradition, as far as they themselves emerge from doctrines delivered by Tradition." from particularity to universality. At the beginning a writing was known as apostolical by the local Church to which it was addressed. Only little by little did it reach the entire Church. On the contrary, the doctrine of Christ was delivered to all the apostles equally, and by them to the Churches to which they preached. Scripture remains particular; it is a particular formulation of the universal doctrine. To oppose them would be absurd. And it is equally erroneous to read the particular as if the light of the universal could not shine upon it: "Christ having delivered by the hands of his apostles two things to his Church, his Doctrine, as the necessary and substantial aliment thereof, and his Scriptures, ad abundattiiam, it was convenient, the strength of Tradition, for one, should far exceed its strength for the other; yet so that even the weaker should not fail to be assured and certain." 110 Thomas White's concept of Scripture and tradition is remarkable for several reasons. In the first place, his approach sounds surprisingly modern to us. His problem is exactly the one on which attention has been focused in recent years: Is all revealed doctrine in Scripture? His answer is a definite yes, qualified from the standpoint of how Scripture is read: it must be read in the light of tradition, with the purpose of illustrating the faith rather than finding texts to prove it. Scripture is not a storehouse of texts for arguments; it is written for edification and should be used for that purpose. It acquires value in the light of the Church's doctrine rather than as a result of scientific exegesis.
In the second place, White's conceptions are a perfect example of what is commonly considered to be a pre-Reformation theology. Yet he wrote in the middle of the Counter Reformation and belonged to a section of the Church caught in a polemical situation in which he himself was actively engaged. In other words, White forces us to revise our interpretation of the Counter Reformation. That the Counter Reformation universally taught the doctrine of two partial sources of faith is a myth.
In the third place, one cannot help feeling that White not only anticipated our problems but also already answered them. He does leave us still unsatisfied on the matter of the development of doctrine, to which he does not give the importance which the post-Newman era sees in it. But on the relationships of Scripture and tradition, his position is patently that which Geiselmann has described as disappearing after the Council of Trent and reviving in the School of Tübingen: it was very much alive in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The authors which this article surveys evidence such a survival many years after the Council of Trent. My previous study of Christopher Davenport already permitted the same conclusion to be drawn. From the viewpoint of the history of theology, this is notable enough. But one should also look at the matter from the standpoint of the best way to approach Scripture and tradition. It is now a moot question whether we are not today recovering as something new an old view which we had forgotten: our problems may have been solved already in the seventeenth century. With this possibility in mind, this inquiry acquires a certain piquancy.
In the fourth place, White to some extent anticipated also the problematic of the traditionalist school in the nineteenth century. His comparison of the process of tradition to the communication of knowledge and principles by father to son, his qualification of tradition as a universal element contradistinguished from the particularity of writing, belong to the understanding of tradition as a universal human phenomenon, which the philosophy of the traditionalists will develop two centuries later and which will find its way into theology in the Lammenaisian school of thought, in Lacordaire's Conferences of Notre Dame, and in the writings of Joseph de Maistre. This school has little influence today, partly on account of its exaggerated claims for tradition as a phenomenon of culture, partly because of the condemnation of Lammenais by Pope Gregory XVI in 1832.
111 But this should not blind us to the fact that more recent Old Testament and New Testament exegesis has found traces in the Bible of such a tradition as was described by these men of the nineteenth century. Thus Thomas White appears, in the seventeenth century, as a genial anticipator of future trends.
JOHN BELSON
The theology of Thomas White, as it refers to tradition, was not, in the English seventeenth century, an aberrant phenomenon. For White According to the Dialogues there is a sense, acceptable to Catholics, in which all revealed truth is in Scripture. "You know the Dialogues hold Catholicism may be victoriously evidenced to be more con formable to Scripture than Protestancy by argument purely drawn from the text, without extrinsical helps."
112 They maintain "that a discreet and diligent perusal of Scripture will make a man a perfect Catholic, but not with that steady firmness as to be able to evince his religion before a critical judge, against a wrangling and crafty adversary. deny) "that all is so contained as is necessary for the salvation of mankind; to which effect we conceive certainty and to that evidence requisite, neither of which are within the compass of naked words left without any guard to the violent and contrary storms of criticism.
,,n7
Belson formulates exactly the pending question several times. " 'Tis true also that the reader, duly qualified, may by due reading Scripture come to truth; but that this truth will be enough to serve all the exigencies of all mankind in all circumstances, or that what satisfied his sincerity and diligence will be able to satisfy all manner of peevishness and obstinacy, are two positions which I see you have not, and think you cannot prove." 118 That one man or even many men can be saved through Scripture alone "is nothing to our question, whether it be sufficient for the conduct of aU dispositions found in mankind, through all circumstances the Church will be in from the Resurrection to the day of Judgement."
119 The problem, then, is not whether Scripture contains revelation, but whether it is the ultimate means of salvation for all mankind. While Protestants teach the latter, Catholics only admit the former. Thus Belson replies to Hammond: "Your conclusion ... does not in any way prejudice the tenet I am maintaining; to contain sufficient truths and to be a sufficient means to salvation (which may possibly be true on respect of some persons and circumstances) being quite another thing than to decide all quarrels carried on by factiously litigious persons, and this in all times and cases."
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The salvation of mankind, not the writing down of revelation, is in question: "That faith has been so transmitted by Tradition that it has not been written, is not Mr. White's tenet, but that that writing, at least the writings we have, is not able so to transmit it as is necessary for the salvation of mankind, without Tradition." 121 As Belson is thus suggesting, Catholics and Protestants have been arguing at crosspurposes. Both of them teach that all revelation is contained in some way in Scripture. But, for Protestants, this gives mankind a sufficient knowledge of revelation, whereas for Catholics reading Scripture alone, without tradition, provides no sufficient knowledge of revelation for mankind in general, whatever particular exceptions may be admitted in rare circumstances. 124 which may be expressed in fewer or in more numerous words according to the needs of the audience. Therefore, Scripture will be "the very same" as tradition, once the truths it contains "are indisputably acknowledged and practised both with constancy and high esteem by a multitude."
126 But Scripture, being written once for all, does not explain itself, while tradition, being constantly spoken and preached, comments on itself at whatever length is necessary. Admittedly, Scripture must have been fully adequate to its readers' needs when it was written; but this no longer obtains for its readers today. " 'Tis true that Scripture was intended to be intelligible to those to whom it was written, but not to after ages without other means."
126 Today the only way to be certain of the meaning is to stand in the line of tradition. Belson sums up his argument in a passage that deserves full quoting on account of its clarity and forcefulness:
You assert: We deny Scripture to be the rule of faith; every of which words deserves its particular reflexion. For first, by Scripture is meant either words or sense; that is, the words containing a sense, so as that another may be found in the same words; or else a sense expressed accidentally by such words and which might have been expressed by others. By a rule, since 'tis our belief must be regulated, and our belief is of things, not sounds, is understood either a determinate sense or a certain means to arrive at it. We say then that Scripture, taken the first way, cannot be a rule, nothing being more evident than that words, merely as such, are neither sense nor means to arrive at a determinate one, since the same words may comprehend many senses. Take Scripture the second way, and the question is quite changed; none denies the sense of it to be the word of God by which all our belief and actions are to be regulated; our dispute then in that case is not whether it be a rule, but how 'tis known: whether by the bare words in which 'tis couched (which The word "tradition" is not, however, free of all ambiguity. The sort of tradition that Belson understands to be Christian must be carefully distinguished from another, which he associates with Jews. In so doing, Belson eliminates esoteric concepts of tradition, as an oral transmission taking place in secret, known only to a few: "Tradition with us signifies a public delivery to a multitude, so as what was so delivered was settled in their understanding and rooted in their hearts by a constant visible practice. Their [the Jews'] Tradition was a close underhand conveyance from a few to a few, neither so many nor so honest as to be secure from mistakes, both accidental and wilful, and yet the cheat, if any happened, remaining by the secrecy undiscovered, so that nothing more apt to make void the Law of God than such a Tradition as this. doned of God during the Commonwealth, 1 * 7 the stress is placed on the word of God, for all doctrine is contained in and taught by the word. Indeed, since Scripture is the word of God, Catholics believe "the canon of Holy Scripture to be perfect, a perfect light to our feet, a lantern to our paths, a perfect rule of faith, provided ... that the line of propheti cal and apostolical interpretation be levelled according to the square of ecclesiastical and Catholic sense."
188 But whatever our respect and love for Scripture, "a large field, full sown with the precious wheat of the Gospel," 189 we must never sever Scripture from the Church:
For though the Scripture be the Word of God, yet the Church is the Spouse of Christ; though the Scripture is the Spouse's deed of jointure, yet the Church is the Spouse herself; though the Scripture is the truth herself, yet the Church is the ground of truth. Though the Scripture be the Law, yet the Church is the Kingdom of Christ; this Kingdom must be governed by that Law, but that Law must be interpreted by the representatives of that Kingdom. Christ is the door, the Scrip ture is the lock, the Church is the key of Paradise. The repository of these unwritten beliefs is the Church, that is, the heart of the faithful. "I know you cannot believe that God's Word, folded up in characters or letters, figured with ink, painted or impressed on paper, should add such awe and reverence over the unwritten verities of God, which are ingrafted and preserved in conservatives that are more noble, viz. the heart of man, the mouth of the Church, the lips of her priests, the fiery tongues of the Apostles, that you should utterly abolish them."
143 Thus inscribed in living hearts, the word can be expressed as befits all circumstances, adapted to all the controversies and hesitancies of each day. "Shall the infinite knowledge of the Holy Ghost, which shall increase in us more and more the later days, daily teaching and instructing the Church, be restrained and limited to volumes written so long ago?" 144 Thus Bailey briefly outlines a theology of development: the Holy Ghost continually teaches the Church, making the word relevant to all historical happenings and increasing our knowledge of the truth. All this perfectly fits the emphasis on the word that we have already found among the other English authors we have surveyed. The only difference lies in the concept of a limited Scripture, beyond which the word overflows into a number of unwritten verities preserved in the hearts of the faithful and formulated from time to time by the Church.
Bailey coins eloquent expressions to describe Scripture and to extol tradition. The latter is "the principal means that was to be used for a right understanding of the divine verity, as the common road unto the Catholic Church and the high way to heaven, the footsteps of the flock of Christ, the tents that were pitched by his own shepherds, the direct, beaten and unerring path of Esaias, the touchstone of truth, the pilot's staff, the broad seal of the Kingdom of Christ, which, once broken, anything is religion and everything is lawful." 145 The Scriptures, in turn, are "the fountains of life, the manna from heaven, the sea of wisdom, the armory of the Holy Ghost, the promptuary of God ... the will and testament of Jesus Christ... the light of the world ... the suprema lex." u * As such, they are radically related to the tradition which keeps them, explains them, completes them. This is where Bailey's theology on the relationship of Scripture The relationship of the first item, Scripture, to the other three, is that which Gother has described as uniting "the Judge and the Law." Scripture is the law; and the Church, manifesting her mind in councils, in the successive apostolic tradition, in worship, provides the interpretation which conveys the sense of the law. This inquiry may be brought to an end here. We have reached the last decades of the seventeenth century. We are in the great age of the Counter Reformation, in a group of authors belonging to the oppressed Catholic minority of a Protestant country. Yet a dominant-perhaps the dominant-understanding of Scripture and tradition follows the classical pattern set by the Fathers and preserved by the Schoolmen, rather that the categories which our textbooks attribute to the postTridentine era. It is in the context of the classical pattern of thought that the Council of Trent is understood.
